



UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

OFFICE OF THE AID REPRESENTATIVE

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5 May 1988

Mr. Gordon Ransom, RIG/I/S

Gordon,

Attached is a report just received from Afghanaid which deals with the cash for food mission of October/November 1987 in which Afghanis 3,227,500 (about \$19,000) was lost/stolen.

We look forward to your arrival and assistance in this matter.

  
Jack Miller  
Acting AID Rep

cc: Jeff Malick, ANE/SA



Tlx : 52448 IRC PE PK  
Tel : 41274 & 41845, 43242

# International Rescue Committee

G.P.O. 504, PESHAWAR - PAKISTAN

MAY 3 1988  
REC'D

Mr. Peter Rees,  
Field Director  
Afghanaid (U.K.)  
58 Gulmohar Rd.  
Peshawar

April 28, 1988

Dear Peter,

Thank you for the preliminary report dated 27 April 1988. It answers many of the questions I have had regarding your program. Please try to finalize the report as soon as possible, since the quarterly report for the period January-March 1988 is now due.

Also I want to thank you and Juliette for assisting Qaiser in examining and preparing the needed financial reports.

Best Regards,

Tom Yates

c.c. Mr. Al Nahoda  
✓ Mr. Jack Miller  
IRC New York

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THE 1987 'CASH FOR FOOD' DELIVERY  
TO THE PANJSHIR VALLEY

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## 1. Organisation

Owing to the very late arrival of the 'cash for food money', little time was available for the organisation of its transportation to the Panjshir. No suitable guide was available at the time and a horse driver was selected.

In Garm Chashma, the monitor was delayed for ten days by a heavy snowstorm.

The logistics commander for the North-East agreed on the necessity of an escort and as a caravan of 150 horses was about to depart, it was decided that the money should travel in convoy with the caravan. The money was contained in seven large steel boxes (36"x16"x24"), but the logistics commander felt that these were too bulky to negotiate some of the narrow passages on the upper areas of the passes (the monitor later saw many areas along the route where they could not have passed and would have had to be unloaded). He also felt that they would attract undue attention in Nuristan, owing to the padlocks. Both valid points, the monitor agreed to the transfer of the money to sacks.

Due to the large police presence in Garm Chashma and the risk of being informed upon, it was necessary for the monitor to spend the ten day period in a refugee's tent on the outskirts of the village. The logistics commander took responsibility for the transfer, aided by the horse-driver and Commander Masood's nephew, who happened to be in the area. The monitor was informed that the boxes were kept in a locked storeroom.

## 2. The Route In

On the 21st October, the convoy departed and reached the Nuristani border checkpoint at Peshawrak two days later. Here, the atmosphere was distinctly more hostile than two months earlier, when the monitor had also passed through the area. On that previous occasion the monitor had been filming in the area and found evidence of a strong pro-Kabul element amongst the younger officials of the Nuristan Government. Approximately 40% of the caravan, or 40-50 horse-loads were searched but fortunately none of the 'cash for food' sacks were opened. Had the money been in padlocked boxes, they would almost certainly have been opened and the risk of being accosted by thieves along the route greatly increased.

After a three hour delay the caravan was allowed to proceed.

There was heavy snow on Papruk pass (16,380 feet) and this resulted in considerable delays and spending a night at high altitude in winter, for which most of the mujahideen were not well equipped.

As the convoy approached Poruns, near the base of Kantiwah valley, Badakshanis and Panjshiris travelling to Pakistan informed the monitor of trouble in Kantiwah. Vague accounts of two Frenchmen having been robbed of 90 million Afghanis and another westerner being shot, were related to the monitor (this later proved to be 2 Guilde du Raide monitors, with 40 million Afghanis and a British cameraman, Andy Skrzyphowski).

The monitor went to the local Jamiat commander in Poruns, posing as a French doctor with four loads of medicine and discussed the situation. The

caravan of 150 horses proceeded to Kantiwah where, the monitor later learnt, they were stripped of all their loads and personal items.

When this news reached Poruns the monitor asked the Commander what action he was prepared to take to ensure the safety of other Jamiat supplies bound for the Panjshir, during their passage through the Hesbi controlled area of Kantiwah. He offered an armed escort but this never materialized.

Two days later it became obvious to the monitor that the Commander was not prepared to help. The monitor was faced with three options:

1. To return to Peshawar:

This would have left the Panjshiri civilians without their 'cash for food' during the difficult winter period. It would also have meant being searched by the Nuristani border officials below Pule Rustam, who check all traffic travelling to Pakistan. The risk of the money being siezed (either overtly or through the guise of thieves) by Mullahi Afzal, the Emir of Nuristan, or some of the pro-Kabul element of his government was considerable.

2. To wait in Poruns and send information on to Massoud, hoping that he would rectify the situation:

This would have taken several months and would almost certainly have involved wintering in Nuristan until the following May or June, when the passes re-opened. As in the first option it would have left the Panjshiris without their winter 'cash for food'.

3. To try and find an alternative route:

At the time (late October) Commander Massoud was preparing to attack Karona Munjan, but news of this did not reach the monitor until some three weeks later. The Sedrem-Poruns pass route to Badakshan was still closed. This left the Tetin-Gandalabouk-Aryu pass route as the only alternative. It is not used by mujahideen travelling to the Panjshir as it is not possible for laden horses to cross it. It involved some risk as there are two Hesbi controlled areas to cross and the Dahne Pyar - Gadwal section is pro-government with a post just below Gadwal. Panjshiris travelling on foot use this route in the winter when the Kantiwah pass is closed. In the past they had been allowed to pass without hindrance.

The monitor decided that this last option was the only acceptable one and informed the local Jamiat commander that he intended to try it. At this juncture, Massoud's nephew appeared on the scene. The monitor appraised him of the situation and with three armed mujahideen, agreed to accompany him.

The first Hesbi area was successfully crossed accompanied by a representative of the Jamiat commander; he escorted the party through to Kurdar, the next Jamiat base. Here it was necessary to hire local mujahideen to carry the loads across Tetin pass. The route is steep and unsuitable for horses and during the descent, several horses suffered nasty falls. At Tetin, Massoud's nephew and the monitor spoke to the Jamiat commander about the route ahead. He informed them of a small Hesbi strength, three hours walk south-west of the village. He also said that the Hesbi mujahideen had left the village and were attacking a government post further down the valley. Although no-one had travelled north along this route with horses, southbound Panjshiris had had no trouble with

either the Hesbi people at Gandalabouk or in the pro-government area north of it.

On the second of November, while passing through Gandalabouk, the group was stopped by mujahideen of Hesb-i Islami, the escort was disarmed and the sacks of 'cash for food' and personal belongings were siezed. The monitor, the escort and the horsemen were taken to a house and held there. The monitor and Massoud's nephew remonstrated with Hazarat Gul, the Hesbi commander, but to no avail. Later the monitor and Massoud's nephew were escorted to the senior Hesbi commander, Sheer Mahmud, some two hours away, where they were informed that Hekmatyar had said that "all Western journalists travelling to the Panjshir were enemies of Afghanistan". Before leaving, Massoud's nepher had informed one of the Jamiat escort to attempt to escape to a nearby Jamiat base and return with help.

The following morning Massoud's nephew and the monitor were sent back, under escort, to Gandalabouk; a sealed letter of instruction to Hazarat Gul was also sent. On reaching the village they were informed by the horsemen that one of their party had successfully escaped. An hour later armed Jamiat mujahideen, from a nearby base walked into Gandalabouk. For two days there was a see-saw situation as more and more Jamiat and Hesbi forces arrived and took up position around the village. Late in the second day, the Jamiat forces closed the route from down the valley where 600 Hesbis were approaching the area. More Jamiat forces arrived from the North and East and, at about 2.00pm on November the 5th, heavily outnumbered, the Hesbi commander finally caved in and the party was released.

The monitor was not allowed to examine the sacks privately and, not wishing to further excite the frustrated Hesbi commander, he did not count the money. The internal waterproof sacks were checked for approximate weight and a small hole cut in each to verify that the money had not been substituted with paper. The sewing lines on the internal sacks were scrutinized and both the monitor, Massoud's nephew and the guide were satisfied that they had not been broached.

The monitor noted that approximately 1.3 laks of travelling expenses was missing from one of the rucksacks.

It is interesting to note that Hesbi had information, in early October, of French money going to the Panjshir and the Hesbi commanders at Kantiwah and Gandalabouk had been ordered to stop it. This was related to the monitor by Hazarat Gul, the Hesbi commander before he left Gandalabouk.

At this stage, the monitor decided that it was unsafe to proceed up the valley without a heavily armed escort as the whole area was, by now, aware that a large sum of money was present. This news would have travelled very quickly along the route up the valley into the pro-government area where local highway-men pose a considerable threat. The senior Jamiat commander refused to provide an escort, as he was at war with the groups to the North and it was unsafe for his men to travel through the area.

The monitor decided to send the guide ahead to the Panjshir to inform Emir Saranwar Mahmoud of the situation and to return with an armed escort. As the route from the Jamiat Base near Gandalabouk to the Panjshir was unsuitable for horses, the monitor told them to proceed ahead with the guide. Massoud's nephew and one other Panjshiri stayed with the monitor.

On the morning of the 18th of November, the Jamiat mujahidee intercepted a radio communication between Hazarat Gul, the Hesbi commander at Gandalabouk and his senior, Sheer Mahmud. In it, Hazarat Gul informed Sheer Mahmud that an armed Panjshiri group had passed through Gandalabouk travelling towards Kolatan and he suspected they would then move North with the money. Sheer Mahmud ordered him to lay some ambushes along possible routes.

Later that evening the Panjshiri group arrived and the following day Din Mahmud Khan, the escort commander, and the monitor took stock of the situation and planned the safest route. Some horses had returned with the escort but they were on the main route, the one most likely to be ambushed, and hence unusable.

The route eventually decided upon was high across the mountains without using tracks. It was necessary to hire local men to carry the money and using a map, the dangerous section was crossed. The monitor later learnt that three ambushes had been set, at Dahne Pyar, Bajagul and one on a mountain track east of Bajagul.

The main route was rejoined near Done Nilaw, where horses were hired. From there it took five days to reach Aryu pass and cross into the Panjshir. The pro-government area was crossed without any problems.

### 3. Missing Money

On reaching Dashte Rewat the money was counted by Mahmud Khan, of the financial committee, Massoud's nephew and the monitor. It came to a total of 95,412,500 Afghanis. On leaving Peshawar the monitor was told that he was carrying 98,640,000 Afghanis, therefore at some point along the route 3,227,500 was stolen.

There are four possibilities:

1. During the transfer of the funds from the boxes to sacks at Garm Chashma or during the following nine days.

The transfer was done by the logistics commander of the North-east, the guide and Massoud's nephew. Both Massoud's nephew and the guide stated that they felt all the money had been transferred. The Jamiat representative in Peshawar had told the monitor that the logistics commander was completely reliable. He oversaw the transfer and kept the sacks locked in a storeroom during the nine day delay in Garm Chashma.

2. At Gandalabouk.

For three days the money was in Hesbi hands. When it was returned to the monitor it was not counted; however the seven inner waterproof sacks were checked for holes, the sewing lines were scrutinized and each sack was probed to ensure that the money had not been substituted with paper. All the sacks were hand weighed by the guide and the monitor, both of whom felt that they were approximately correct. All the sacks appeared filled and the sewing lines were along the top of the money. The largest denomination of the bank notes was 1,000 Afghanis, there were also 500 Afghani notes and a very few hundreds. 3,227,500 in 1,000 Afghani notes represents an area of approximately 18"x15"x12" or 1.875 cubic feet. The sacks contained 6 to 8 cubic feet, none of them

the missing money had been in 500 Afghani notes it would have represented half a sackful.

An eighth sack was found to contain Jamiat pamphlets and had been used to counterbalance the seventh sack. The guide said that this was done in Garm Chashma and correct. It was carefully checked at Gandalabouk by the monitor who emptied it there before handing the pamphlets out to the Hesbi mujahideen. There was no money in this eighth sack.

### 3. At Kolatan.

For 2 weeks the money was in a communal room. Massoud's nephew, the other Panjshiri or the monitor were with the money at all times, day and night except on three occasions when the room was padlocked and Emir Din Mahamad Khan had the key. On leaving Kolatan the sacks appeared full and in the same state as when they had arrived.

### 4. Along the route.

This would have been difficult and again would have left a large gap. On arrival in the Panjshir all the sacks appeared full as they were opened. In the opinion of the monitor the money was stolen before or during the transfer from the boxes at Garm Chashma.

### 4. Khawak Karargah, Panjshir

The Karargah of Khawak was selected by Commander Massoud for the monitor to supervise the distribution of 'cash for food'.

Khawak is a small south facing valley running off the Panjshir at the north-eastern end. It is sparsely populated with most of the inhabitants living around the villages of Dehe Khawak. There are some 120 families living in the Karargah, 10 more are refugees and living in the vicinity of Khost in Baghlan. These refugees are mostly ex-residents of the north-western part of the valley, reportedly heavily bombed in the past. Three families are living in Kabul and four in Parian. There are also 15 families of shop-keepers living in Dane Khawak, at the base of the valley.

Many nomads move into the upper reaches of the valley during the summer months, wintering in the warmer northern areas of Baghlan and Kunduz.

Neither the shop-keepers, nomads or those families involved in the Lapis Lazuli trade receive financial assistance.

Most of the heads of families are small-holder farmers cultivating wheat, maize, peas and some potatoes. The soil is fairly poor but as the valley faces south this compensates to some extent. Most of the arable land was under cultivation and random questioning revealed that there had been a reasonable harvest this autumn. Little or no fertilizer is used because of the expense. There is a plentiful year-round water supply.

Dehe Khawak, the main village, contains some 20 houses, 2 chai khanes and a small shop.

Andarab pass and the village of Chawni Khawak, in the north-western branch of the valley, were reportedly heavily bombed last year. The writer was informed that 120 houses had been destroyed there (20-30 would



be a more realistic figure, as only 10 people were killed and the village is supposedly the same size as Dehe Khawak). This year the bombing has been much lighter and a reported 40 families returned to the area. The monitor saw no indication of any bombing in Dehe Khawak but some along the north-eastern pass to Parian. It would seem that the government policy has been to attack the supply lines rather than drive the population out.

Civilian morale was relatively high, by Afghan standards, and the houses visited by the monitor were warm with a good supply of blankets. The men, women and children were adequately clothed for the winter months and although many of the clothes were tattered and cloth wrappings rather than shoes were worn, no-one appeared to suffer as a result of the cold. Sanitation standards were reasonable, the fouled areas seen by the monitor were well away from the river banks. A teacher had recently arrived in Khawak and was in the process of setting up a school.

##### 5. The Distribution

As the Karargah of Khawak is relatively well off, the sum distributed per family was small. Each head of family received 4,000 Afghanis plus a supplementary 200 per child. The decision as to which families were to receive assistance was taken by Commander Massoud in conjunction with Mahmud Khan of the financial committee. It would normally have been done by Engineer Kamaludin, but he and other members of the committee were absent. The monitor was informed that they were in the lower Panjshir distributing the first batch of money (75,900,000 Afs), which preceded the monitor by two months.

The distribution was carried out by Mahmud Khan at the local mujahideen base near Dehe Khawak. The commander sent several of his men out to summon the heads of families, most of whom arrived within eight hours. The standard procedure of receipting by thumb-print was used and the recipients seemed familiar with the system. The distribution appeared well organized and random questioning revealed that most of the civilians had previously received financial aid. The monitor felt that there was a need for assistance in the Karargah, but that the situation in Khawak was not desperate (see appendix B for sample questioning of the heads of families).

The sum distributed was too small to effectively benefit the families (see appendix A prices), but was useful to slightly improve their standard of living over the winter period.

When the monitor questioned Commander Massoud on civilian aid he received the following reply:

"The situation for the civilians is better than last year. We give the money to the civilians to improve their position, to buy another cow, seed and farming equipment. Sadly for the internal refugees it is very difficult, they suffer from many shortages. We try and make it possible for them to remain in Afghanistan."

The monitor felt that, had the money been received in the spring, late May or early June, some of it would probably have been spent on seed or fertilizer but in December with winter setting in, it would almost certainly be spent on food and clothing. He also felt that the need in

The monitor was informed that in areas where conditions were harder, larger amounts of 'cash for food' were distributed.

Receipts for both tranches of 'cash for food' were provided by Massoud and the monitor received the receipts for the money disbursed in Khawak Karargah. The receipts for the first tranche were not available, this money was being distributed in the lower Panjshir by the financial committee. These receipts and the receipts from the other Karargahs of the 'cash for food' the monitor accompanied should reach Peshawar in the spring of 1988.

## 6. The Panjshir. General Situation.

The monitor visited three other side valleys during his time in the Panjshir and felt that the conditions in Khawak were representative of those off the upper free area of the Panjshir valley.

The Panjshir valley floor has been heavily bombed and from Pushghour up to Dahne Khawak, there is little or no cultivation in progress. Perhaps 7-10% of the population are still living there in the few undestroyed houses and in some cases amongst the ruins. Most have sought refuge in the side valleys or Chitral. As one progresses down the valley the situation deteriorates, and Khenj is little more than a pile of rubble. Owing to the lateness of the season the monitor was unable to visit areas below Pushghour, but Commander Massoud stated that the conditions in the lower valley were far more serious.

According to Abdul Qayum of the Dashte Rewat financial committee half of the 1987 harvest in the main Panjshir valley was destroyed by aerial bombardments. This compares favourably with the previous year when it was almost completely destroyed.

The Karargah of Dashte Rewat suffered 12 casualties in 1987 from bombings and mines. The bombing has decreased, and is generally carried out from a high level with a consequent loss of accuracy. Commander Massoud stated that Stinger, ground to air, missiles reached him in July and since then aerial activity has greatly declined. Both he and Abdul Quayum were optimistic that in 1988 the situation for the civilians would improve and many refugees return.

## 7. Educational Facilities.

The monitor was informed that there were four schools in the upper Panjshir, at Parian, Sefid Sheer, Khenj and Dashte Rewat. He visited the one at Dashte Rewat. There were seventy pupils, all male, between the ages of 8-20 being taught Koranic studies, Farsi, Mathematics and reading and writing from 8.00am to 3.30pm. The financial committee funds the school and feeds the boarding pupils. Approximately 40% of the students are war orphans; the older ones also help with light duties at the nearby mujahideen base. During an attack the school closes; in 1987 thirty-seven school days were lost due to fighting. There are 54 days holiday during the year. The monitor noted an absence of many of the students and felt that the school lacked organisation. The textbooks appeared inadequate and with too much stress on Koranic studies. They were : an Arabic-Farsi

The monitor was informed that the school cost 40 laks Afghanis to administer per annum.

The only other school visited was in Nahrin Baghlan and also under Massoud's administration. It was highly organised and divided into 6 classes with professional teachers and high attendance. It is only fair to add that Nahrin is in a different category, there is little or no bombardment and the town is extremely well administered. Vehicles travel freely between there and Baghlan, food supplies are abundant and the overall situation is close to normality with little sign of a war in progress. The monitor's impression was that Nahrin could quite easily have been a small town in Pakistan.

#### 8. Medical Facilities.

The monitor did not visit any clinics during his two weeks in the Panjshir but spoke with an Afghan doctor at Khenj. He seemed competent by Afghan standards and spoke of an adequate medical supply but a lack of facilities and trained personel for surgery. The monitor was informed that there were no foreign clinics operating in the Panjshir in 1987.

#### 9. The Mujahideen - Civilian Relationship.

The Panjshiri civilians appear inured to war and accept the mujahideen as a necessary defence against the Soviet and government forces. They have probably suffered more than those in most other areas of Afghanistan, where the civilians have remained in location. Few places have been as successfully defended and, under a less capable commander than Massoud, the valley would almost certainly have been over-run and the population forced to flee to Pakistan.

The civilians seem aware of this and hold Massoud and his junior commanders in great respect. The monitor was impressed by the high level of co-operation between the civilians and the mujahideen throughout the area under Massoud's administration. The civilians gave the impression of being aware they were part of the war effort and their morale was consequently high.

#### 10. The Military Situation.

According to Massoud the situation has improved this year. There were fewer aerial bombardments and Soviet and government operations in the North-east have declined. Massoud has adopted a military strategy similar to Mao's and sees the war as developing in four phases:

1. Creating a military and administrative network, training it to act cohesively and arming it.
2. Clearing his area of enemy positions.
3. Mounting offensives from the area.

In Parwan-Kapisa, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakshan, he is entering the second phase. In 1986 he took two major posts, Farhar and Nahrin, and last year he took Kalaafghan, Korona Munjan, Burka and Shera which shows a large increase in military activity. The government forces on the other hand have become more static. In areas where the government know that Stingers are present, there is little or no aerial activity. Massoud's problems with Hesbi and the Pakistanis responsible for supplying the mujahideen seem more serious.

Extracts from an interview with Massoud, 10 December 1987:

Q: "How are your relations with Hesbi?"

A: "Sadly very bad. The problem with Hesbi is neither ideological nor tactical. We believe the same things and we are both fighting to drive the Soviets out. It is one of power; Gulbudin wants complete control of the resistance.

I try very hard to talk to Hesbi commanders in the north and many of them would like to, but they know that if Gulbudin finds out he will cut off their supplies. Many have come over to Jamiat because they see we have a good administrative organisation and the population is well looked after in my areas. 15 days ago (25 Nov '87) Mullah Nadar of Takhar, a Hesbi commander with 1500 men joined us. We now have good relations with Engineer Bashir of Baghlan, an important Hesbi commander. With Khales, Harakat and NIFA, I have good relations.

Gulbudin feels that within two to three years, the Soviets will leave but he knows Jamiat will always be here, so his main thrust is against us and not the government. In the north, Hesbi lack co-ordination, training and a knowledge of tactics; many of their commanders are unable to take government posts so they attack us instead, knowing that Gulbudin will give them more weaponry if they do."

Q: "And your relations with the Pakistanis?"

A: "The Pakistanis arm groups with which they have good relations, but it is a relationship of master and servant. I feel that independence of action is more important than the weaponry they can supply. Take the figures for Parwan-Kapisa in the last 2 years; we captured 2500-3000 Kalashnikovs, from Pakistan we received 940. We have many more captured mortars and machine-guns than we have received from Pakistan. Our main problem is heavier weaponry and its ammunition, we have very little. I have five or six BM 1's and 3 BM 12's, so when I want to mount an attack we have to bring all of them together from Parwan, Kapisa, Badakshan, Takhar and Baghlan. This takes a long time and after the attack we send them back.

Air defence is another serious problem. Stingers have been supplied since October '86 but I received them only two months ago and very few. The Pakistanis have supplied them mostly to groups along the border, to defend Pakistan.

So far this lack of supplies has not been critical but it hampers our ability to mount big operations."

Q: "What do you see for the coming year?"

A: "Not much change, the Soviets will stay, the government will talk about cease-fires but will continue to try and improve their position.

We will continue to strengthen our organisational structure and to develop relations with other groups of mujahideen in other areas but until we receive heavy armaments, we shall not be able to mount large-scale attacks."

The monitor noted very few aircraft during his travels throughout the north-east and apart from a Soviet push towards Andarab, no government ground activity.

Besides the trouble from Hesbi at Kantiwah and Gandalabouk, the monitor was informed by several sources that during the attack on Burka, in Baghlan (24/12/87), a Hesbi group stationed nearby, under Satar Gul Kadir, joined the fighting on the government side inflicting heavy casualties on the attacking Jamiat mujahideen.

The Monitor was impressed by Massoud's grasp of tactics and the positive mental attitude of his mujahideen. Having travelled widely throughout Southern, Eastern and Northern Afghanistan with Jamiat, Hesbi, Khales, Harakat Inquilabi, Harakat i-Islami, NIFA and Mojadedi groups in the last two years, the monitor felt that the Jamiat organization in the North-east was by far the best in the country and posed the greatest threat to the government of Kabul.

#### 11. The Route Out.

Owing to recent snowfalls and the lateness in the season (9th December), it was impossible for the monitor to return by the newly opened route through Badakshan.

The monitor decided not to use the southern route as it would involve travelling through Gandalabouk and other Hesbi areas. He had received information that three other journalists were being held there by Hesbi after coming out of the Panjshir. The monitor chose to travel North and then West of Kabul before cutting south-east and entering Pakistan through Waziristan, near Wana. This took thirty-seven days, as North of Ghazni the passes were blocked to vehicular traffic by snow. He reached Pakistan on the 15th of January.

#### 12. Conclusions and Recommendations.

The main problems which arose on this trip, arose as a result of:

1. Bad organisation by Jamiat in Peshawar.
2. Improper packaging of the 'cash for food'.
3. The fighting between Hesbi and Jamiat.
4. The late arrival of the 'cash for food'.

1. If the previous Jamiat personnel in charge of the programme had been used, the money would have gone in under escort with a competent guide. Due to their absence and the rush to beat the snow, the organisation was left to someone unfamiliar with the problems likely to be encountered.

2. In future it should be packed in re-inforced zippered heavy-duty plastic bags (available in the U.K.). These should be padlockable.
3. Now that the Badakshan route has been opened, future 'cash for food' instalments will not need to pass through Hesbi controlled areas and travel time will be cut to 8 days.
4. The donors must ensure that the 'cash for food' reaches Peshawar no later than mid-September to ensure that the organisers have ample time to prepare the dispatching of the money. It is also important so that the monitors can return via the Chitral route; by early November this becomes uncertain. The route North and West of Kabul involves a certain amount of risk.

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APPENDIX A

Dahne Khawak Bazaar Prices in Afghanistan

Wheat	350/seer	Fertiliser	1500/seer
Maize	400/seer	Fuel (scrubwood)	5000/month's supply
Peas	150/seer	Lantern oil	400/seer
Potatoes	300/seer	Soap	30/bar
Rice	850/seer	Matches (10 boxes)	40 Afs
Onions	4-500/seer	Lantern	1000 Afs
Lentils (dried)	1400/seer		
Meat	1920/seer	Clothing	
Vegetable oil	3000/seer	Puttu	2000 Afs
Animal fat	4000/seer	Boots (reasonable quality)	2000 Afs
Salt	300/seer	Shalwar kameez	3000 Afs
Sugar	800/seer	Longhi (pesr)	2000 Afs
Tea	5000/seer	Winter overcoat	2000 Afs
Raisins	2500/seer	Pullover	1000 Afs
Mulberries	500/seer		
Walnuts	2000/seer		
Apples	900/seer		

General Livestock

Pack horse	50-60,000 Afs
Donkey	40,000
Cow (ploughing standard)	40-50,000
Goat	6-7,000
Sheep	10-12,000
Chicken	500

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APPENDIX B

Details of a random sample of civilians from Khawak receiving Cash-for-Food.

Name: Skandar Khan  
Profession: Farmer  
Family: 1 wife 5 children  
Size of farm: 5 jerebs  
Crops: Wheat, maize, peas  
Livestock: 1 horse  
Diet: Bread & peas - eat all their own produce  
Home: Bombed, living in Refugees House  
Cash-for-Food: 5000 Afs

Name: Fateh Mahmud  
Profession: Farmer  
Family: 1 wife 2 children and a cousin  
Size of farm: Did not know  
Crops: Wheat and peas  
Livestock: 1 cow  
Cash-for-Food: 4,400 Afs

Name: Mullawi Sarajudin  
Profession: Farmer and Mullah  
Family: 1 wife 6 children  
Size of farm: 3 jerebs producing 500 seer per annum  
Crops: Wheat, maize, peas  
Livestock: 1 horse, 2 cows, 1 goat  
Cash-for-Food: 5,200 Afs

Name: Affizullah  
Profession: Farmer  
Family: 1 wife 1 child  
Size of farm: 3 jerebs  
Crops: Wheat, maize, peas & potatoes  
Livestock: 1 horse, 1 cow, 2 hens  
Cash-for-Food: 4,200 Afs